We study the following simple Bayesian auction setting: mitems are sold to n selfish bidders in mindependent second-price auctions. Each bidder has a private valuation function that specifies his or her complex preferences over all subsets of items. Bidders only have beliefs about the valuation functions of the other bidders, in the form of probability distributions. The objective is to allocate the items to the bidders in a way that provides a good approximation to the optimal social welfare value. We show that if bidders have submodular or, more generally, fractionally subadditive (aka XOS) valuation functions, every Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the resulting game provides a 2-approximation to the optimal social welfare. Moreover, we show that in the full-information game, a pure Nash always exists and can be found in time that is polynomial in both m and n. 
INTRODUCTION

(Bayesian) Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
Combinatorial auctions are fundamental to economic theory and have also been the subject of extensive research in computer science. In a combinatorial auction, m items M = {1, . . . , m} are sold to n bidders N = {1, . . . , n}. Each bidder i has a valuation function (or valuation, in short) v i that assigns a nonnegative real number to every subset of the items. v i expresses i's preferences over bundles of items. The value v i (S) can be thought of as specifying i's maximum willingness to pay for S. Two standard assumptions are made regarding v i : v i (∅) = 0 (normalization), and v i (S) ≤ v i (T ) for every two bundles S ⊆ T (monotonicity). The objective is to find a partition of the 1 Of much theoretical and practical interest are combinatorial auctions with item bidding, where the auctioneer sells the items by simultaneously running mindependent single-item auctions. Inspired by auctions on eBay, we investigate the simple auction setting in which m items are sold in m independent second-price auctions, and each bidder can participate in any number of these single-item auctions. This auction setting induces a game in which a bidder's strategy is the m-dimensional vector of bids he or she submits in the different single-item auctions, and his or her payoff is his or her value for the set of items he or she is allocated minus his or her payments. Unfortunately, some unnatural complications arise: consider the scenario that m = 1, n = 2, and the two bidders have complete information about each other. Let v 1 (1) = 1 and v 2 (1) = 0. Observe that the optimal social welfare is 1 (assign item 1 to bidder 1). Also observe that if bidder 1 bids 0 and bidder 2 bids 1, then this is a pure Nash equilibrium with a social welfare value of 0. Hence, the price of anarchy of this full-information game, that is, the ratio between the optimal solution and worst-case social welfare in equilibrium, is unbounded.
Observe that in the previous scenario, bidder 2 bid for (and got) an item he or she was not interested in possessing. We argue that such situations are unlikely to occur in practice, especially if bidders are only partially informed and are thus more inclined to avoid risks. We therefore make the assumption that bidders "play it safe," in the sense that a bidder will not submit bids that might (in some scenario) result in getting a negative payoff. We call this the no-overbidding assumption. A strategy of bidder i is a bid-vector b i = (b i (1), b i (2), . . . , b i (m)), where b i ( j) represents i's bid for item j. A bid-vector is called nonoverbidding if the sum of bids over any set of items S does not exceed the value v i (S) of this set (see Definition 2.1).
Our Contributions
(Bayesian) Price of Anarchy in Auctions. We initiate the study of (Bayesian) price of anarchy in auctions and, in particular, of combinatorial auctions with item bidding. Our main result establishes that when bidders' valuations are submodular, that is, exhibit decreasing marginal utilities, any (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this auction game provides a good approximation to the optimal social welfare. A bidder i is said to have a submodular valuation function if for all S,
Equivalently (see, e.g., Lehmann et al. [2001] ), v i is submodular if for every two bundles S ⊆ T that do not contain an item j, it holds that
We present the following result:
THEOREM: Under no-overbidding, and when all valuations are submodular, any (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the auction game approximates the optimum social welfare within a factor of 2.
Our proof of the previous result combines several new ideas and is interesting in its own right. In particular, the proof involves the first application of smoothness [Roughgarden 2012a ] to games with incomplete information [Roughgarden 2012b ].
Moreover, this result holds for the strictly broader class "fractionally subadditive valuations" [Feige 2006] (defined, and termed XOS, in Nisan [2000] ). Importantly, our result is independent of the bidders' beliefs; that is, the 2-approximation ratio is guaranteed for any common probability distribution ("common prior") over the valuation functions (we do require the common prior to be the product of independent probability distributions). Our approach thus suggests a middle ground between the classical economic and the standard computer science approaches: works in economics typically assume that the "input" is drawn from some specific probability distribution and prove results that apply to that specific distribution. In contrast, computer scientists typically prefer worst-case analysis.
Existence and computability of pure Nash equilibria. We study the scenario of interest in which the valuation function of each bidder is known to all other bidders (or, equivalently, the common prior selects a single valuation profile with probability 1). We show that such full-information games always possess a pure Nash equilibrium even if the no-overbidding assumption does not hold. In fact, a simple argument establishes that the socially optimal allocation of items to bidders is achievable in pure equilibrium. Hence, while the price of anarchy in these full-information games is unbounded (without the no-overbidding assumption), the price of stability (the social welfare of the best Nash equilibrium relative to the optimum [Anshelevich et al. 2004] ) is 1.
Optimizing the social welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders is NP-hard [Lehmann et al. 2001] . Can a pure Nash equilibrium that provides a good approximation to the optimal social welfare be computed in polynomial time? We give the following answer for submodular bidders: THEOREM: When bidders have submodular valuations, a pure Nash equilibrium of a full-information game that approximates the optimal social welfare within a ratio of 2 can be computed in polynomial time.
The proof of this theorem shows that the 2-approximation algorithm for maximizing social welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders, due to Lehmann et al. [2001] , can be used to compute the bids in a pure Nash equilibrium. We note that similar questions have been studied by Vetta in [2002] . 2 We provide, for the wider class of fractionally subadditive valuation functions, a constructive way of finding a pure Nash that yields a 2-approximation via a simple and natural myopic procedure (inspired by the greedy approximation algorithm in Dobzinski et al. [2005] ). Unfortunately, this myopic procedure does not, in general, compute a pure Nash equilibrium in polynomial time for fractionally subadditive valuations. Indeed, we show that the myopic procedure may take exponential time by exhibiting a nontrivial construction of an instance on which this can occur.
Follow-Up Work
Since the publication of the conference version of this article [Christodoulou et al. 2008] , there has been a fair amount of follow-up work on studying the price of anarchy of Bayes-Nash equilibria, and on combinatorial auctions with item bidding. Next, we briefly discuss the most relevant references. Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [2011] and Feldman et al. [2013] study the price of anarchy of simultaneous second-price auctions for bidders with subadditive valuation functions. In Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [2011] , it is shown that the price of anarchy for pure Nash equilibria is 2, but it is strictly greater than 2 for Bayes-Nash equilibria. Fu et al. [2012] extended this bound for general valuation functions. Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [2011] coined the term "combinatorial auctions with item bidding," which refers to settings like ours in which multiple items are sold concurrently in single-item auctions. Feldman et al. [2013] prove upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy for Bayes-Nash equilibria and present the best upper and lower bounds to date: 2.061 and 4, respectively.
The Bayesian price of anarchy of simultaneous first-price auctions was studied in Hassidim et al. [2011] , Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] , Feldman et al. [2013] , and Christodoulou et al. [2013] . Hassidim et al. [2011] investigated the existence of pure and mixed equilibria in such auctions and also studied the Bayesian price of anarchy in this context. They showed that pure Nash equilibria are always efficient (when they exist), and they also are upper bounds of 4, O(log m), and O(m) for the price of anarchy of Bayes-Nash equilibria with XOS, subadditive, and general valuations, respectively. They also presented superconstant lower bounds for auctions with superadditive valuations. Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] and Feldman et al. [2013] established upper bounds of e/(e − 1) for XOS valuations and 2 for subadditive valuations, respectively. Recently, Christodoulou et al. [2013] showed tight lower bounds for both cases.
Paes Leme and Tardos [2010] initiated the study of the price of anarchy of generalized second-price auctions. This work was followed in Caragiannis et al. [2011 Caragiannis et al. [ , 2012 for the full information and for the Bayesian setting and even for correlated distributions [Lucier and Paes Leme 2011] . Borodin and Lucier [2010] study the Bayesian price of anarchy of greedy mechanisms, and Roughgarden [2012b] explores methods to bound the price of anarchy in games with incomplete information. Markakis and Telelis [2012] studied the inefficiency of uniform price multiunit auctions. De Keijzer et al. [2013] showed bounds for the price of anarchy of Bayesian equilibria for several formats of multiunit auctions with first or second pricing schemes. Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [2012] study the effect of the price rule of a single item in the equilibrium performance of simultaneous auctions. Alon et al. [2012] investigate the price of anarchy in network cost sharing games in a Bayesian context.
BAYESIAN PRICE OF ANARCHY
In Section 2.1, we present the setting explored in this article. Section 2.2 presents our Bayesian price of anarchy result for pure and mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria. The general proof for mixed equilibria can be found in Appendix 3.2.
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions with Item Bidding
The auction. m items are sold to n bidders in m independent second-price auctions (with some tie-breaking rule). A bidder's strategy is a bid-vector Given a strategy profile b, the items are allocated according to the second-price rule; that is, every object is sold to the highest bidder at a price equal to the second-highest bid.
For any fixed b, we denote by X i (b) the set of items obtained by player i in the auction. For a set S ⊆ M, let the sum of the highest bids be denoted by
and
The utility (payoff) of player i is then given by
We make two assumptions about the bidders: no overbidding, and that the v i s are fractionally subadditive. A valuation is fractionally subadditive if it is the pointwise maximum of a set of additive valuations: a valuation a is additive if for every S ⊆
M, a(S) = j∈S a({ j}). A valuation v i is fractionally subadditive if there are additive valuations
The class of fractionally subadditive valuations is known to be strictly contained in the class of subadditive valuations and to strictly contain the class of submodular valuations [Nisan 2000; Lehmann et al. 2001] .
Definition 2.1. A bid vector b i is said to be nonoverbidding given a valuation
Bayes-Nash equilibria. For all i, let V i denote the finite set of possible valuations of player i. The set of possible valuation profiles of the players is then
There is a known probability distribution D over the valuations V (a common prior). D can be regarded as some market statistics that are known to all bidders (and to the auctioneer) and that specify their beliefs. We assume that
is the probability that bidder i has the valuation function v i . We will use the short notation
A bidding-function B i for player i is a function that assigns a bid-
The reader may find it helpful to think of B i as a suggestion made to player i by the auctioneer as to which bid to submit. An n-tuple of bidding-functions B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ) is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium if for every i ∈ N and for every valuation function v i , the bid B i (v i ) maximizes i's expected utility given that his or her valuation function is v i , and that the bid of every other bidder j is B j (v j ), where v j is drawn from D j . That is, a Bayes-Nash maximizes i's expected payoff for any valuation function he or she may have, given his or her beliefs about the other bidders.
Bayesian price of anarchy. For a fixed valuation profile of the bidders
, where the maximum is taken over all partitions of M into disjoint bundles S 1 , . . . , S n . For given D, the (expected) optimal social welfare SW(OPT) is the expectation E[ OPT(v) ], where v is drawn from D. That is,
SW(OPT) = v∈V
D(v)OPT(v).
Given a valuation profile v, every pure strategy profile b induces a social welfare value
D(v)SW(B(v)).
We are interested in Bayes-Nash equilibria B for which the ratio
is small. The Bayesian price of anarchy of a game is
that is, the maximum of the expression
SW(OPT) SW(B)
, taken over all probability distributions D, and all Bayes-Nash equilibria B (for these probability distributions). Intuitively, Bayesian price of anarchy of α means that no matter what the bidders' beliefs are, every Bayes-Nash equilibrium provides an α-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Bayesian Price of Anarchy of 2
This subsection exhibits our main result. For the sake of readability, we prove the theorem regarding the Bayesian price of anarchy for pure Bayes-Nash equilibria. The extension of the theorem to mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria is presented at the end of the section. The proof exploits the fractional subadditivity of the valuations via the following lemma: LEMMA 2.2. Let S be a set of items, and a be a maximizing additive valuation of player i for this set. If i bids according to a for the elements of S (and 0 for other elements) while all the others bid according to any pure profile b −i , then
PROOF. Let X i := X i (a, b −i ) be the set of items that player i is going to get. Note that if i wins any item j ∈ S, then the maximum bid on this j was 0. Thus, we can assume w.l.o.g. that X i ⊆ S (otherwise, the proof holds with X i ∩ S instead of X i ). Moreover, a( j)− Bids({ j}, b −i ) ≤ 0 holds for every nonobtained item j ∈ S− X i . Therefore, we have
The first inequality uses the definition of v i (X i ) as the maximizing additive valuation for X i , whereas a is one of the additive valuations. The second inequality follows from the inequality for nonobtained items. 
. For all i, we consider a i as an alternative strategy to
Let us fix a bidder i. Let w −i be an arbitrary valuation profile of all bidders except for i. We introduce the short notation
Furthermore, for any S ⊆ M, we will use
Since B is a Bayes-Nash, the strategy B i (v i ) provides higher expected utility to player i than the strategy a i :
The utility values on the left-hand side are
On the right-hand side, applying Lemma 2.2 yields
By merging the previous inequalities, we get
Here the expected highest bids
) obviously holds, since in the latter case we consider maximum bids over a larger set of players. We obtained
We sum over all i and then take the expectation over all valuations v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) on both sides:
. Furthermore, we claim that both summands on the right-hand side are at most SW(B), so that SW(OPT) ≤ 2SW(B), which will conclude the proof. The first summand solves to
Finally, the second summand is
The last inequality holds since for all i, the B i (w i ) contains nonoverbidding bids for any set of items including the obtained set X i (B(w)).
The bound on the price of anarchy holds in general for mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria: 
The proof of the general case consists of a straightforward extension of all (in)equalities to expectations over the mixed bidding strategies. Appendix 3.2 contains the proof.
A simple example shows that even in the full-information setting, this Bayesian price of anarchy result is tight:
Example 2.5. Consider the following example, with two items and two players. The first player values the objects v 1 (1) = v 1 ({1, 2}) = 2, and v 1 (2) = 1, and symmetrically for the second player v 2 (2) = v 2 ({1, 2}) = 2, and v 2 (1) = 1. In the optimum partition, the first player gets the first object and the second player gets the second object. This results in a social welfare of 4.
If the first player bids b 1 (2) = 1, b 1 (1) = 0, and the second b 2 (1) = 1, b 2 (2) = 0, then the first player will get the second object, while the second player will get the first object. This results in a social welfare of 2. Observe that b is a pure Nash equilibrium. Consequently, the price of anarchy is at least 4 2 = 2.
COMPUTING PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA
In this section, we consider the following full-information game: the m items are sold to n bidders with fractionally subadditive valuation functions in m independent secondprice auctions. The players' valuation functions are assumed to be common knowledge.
In Section 3.1, we show that a pure Nash (with nonoverbidding bids) that provides a good approximation to the social welfare always exists in such games and provide a constructive way of finding one. We also prove that the price of stability [Anshelevich et al. 2004 ] is 1; that is, the optimum can always be achieved in a Nash equilibrium. Finally, we describe an example to demonstrate that with this procedure, it might take exponential time to find an equilibrium.
In Section 3.2, we show that if bidders have submodular valuation functions, then a good pure Nash can be reached in polynomial time. 
Fractionally Subadditive Valuation Functions
Despite the fact that (as shown in the Introduction) some Nash equilibria may fail to provide good approximation to the social welfare, we present a constructive way for finding a pure Nash that yields a 2-approximation. We introduce a natural procedure we call POTENTIAL PROCEDURE, which always reaches such an equilibrium. The POTENTIAL PROCEDURE is a simple myopic procedure for fractionally subadditive bidders. } be a set of additive valuations such that for every S ⊆ M, v i (S) = max a∈A i a(S). Since v i is fractionally subadditive, such A i must exist. The procedure simply starts with zero bids b * i ( j), zero per-item prices r j , and an empty set of items S i = ∅ allocated to each player i. Then it lets players best reply one by one to the bids of other players by switching to new nonoverbidding bids. After every round, the sets S i of all agents form a partition (w.l.o.g.) of the item-set, and for every player i, the bids b * i ( j) on his or her "own" items from S i are determined by a maximizing additive valuation from A i for S i and are zero for items not in S i . The bids of other players we regard as current prices r j on each item j for choosing a next best response.
In each round, an arbitrary dissatisfied player k selects a new set T that maximizes his or her utility given the current prices. Since prices are 0 over his or her own set S k , it can be assumed w.l.o.g. that T ⊇ S k (otherwise, T ∪ S k could be chosen), and also that the new bids of player k are never lower than the current price (otherwise, it would be better for him or her to choose a subset of T ). This T becomes his or her new set; that is, he or she robs items from other players, which results in a new item-partition; subsequently, the bids and prices get updated as described earlier. We will prove that if after such a round all players are satisfied with their current sets, then the bids (b * i ) i∈N correspond to a Nash equilibrium (even in the case when overbidding is allowed).
Note that after every round, the bids of all players need to be adjusted to sum up to the exact value of the current set of the player, and be zero elsewhere. In this sense, the procedure slightly differs from a pure best-response procedure but can nevertheless be understood as a natural and realistic distributed process that noncolluding agents could use to converge to an equilibrium.
Remark 3.1. This procedure requires bidder i to be able to determine which bundle he or she would prefer most, given a vector of per-item prices r = (r 1 , . . . , r m ), that is, to declare a bundle S for which v i (S) − j∈S r j is maximized. This type of query is called a demand query and is very common in the combinatorial auctions literature. 6 In addition, the agents must be capable of responding to XOS queries, in that for given S, they can choose their maximizing additive valuation over S.
We use a potential function argument and the fractional subadditivity of the bidders to show that the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE eventually converges to a "good" pure Nash. PROOF. We use a potential function argument. For this purpose, we use as a potential function the function that assigns to a partition of items X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) the social welfare
In particular, we are going to show that whenever there is a strict improvement to a player's utility, this translates into a strict improvement of the social welfare. This will prove that this procedure will terminate, as it converges to a local maximum of the social welfare. Later we will prove that any local maximum of the social welfare corresponds to a pure Nash equilibrium.
Let 
. Therefore, after summing up the previous inequalities over all players i (also for i = k), the prices cancel out and we obtain
Hence, the procedure will terminate, giving a partition that corresponds to a (local) maximum of the social welfare function. Now we will prove that the strategy profile b * resulting from the last partition of the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE is a Nash equilibrium. CLAIM 2. If the valuation functions are fractionally subadditive, then the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE terminates with an n-tuple of bids that is a Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. By contradiction, let's suppose that b * is not a pure Nash equilibrium; that is, there is a player i and a strategy
be the corresponding bundle of items that player i gets if he or she bids b i . Based on b i , we are going to construct a nonoverbidding bid vector b i , which increases the utility of i at least as much as b i does. We will show that b i corresponds to a set X i that would have been chosen by POTENTIAL PROCEDURE (X i or an even better
Let a be the maximizing additive valuation that corresponds to the set X i . For every j / ∈ X i , we assume that b i ( j) = 0 (we can decrease b i ( j) to zero, without affecting player i's utility).
Let O be the set of all items j ∈ X i for which a( j) < r j , and let a be the maximizing additive utility of the set X i \O. The utility that player i would get if he or she bid 0 for all items in O and a on X i \O would be
Therefore, the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE could choose the set X i = X i \O or a set that increases even more the utility of player i, that is, T = arg max S⊆M v i (S) − j∈S\S i r j . This contradicts the fact that the stop condition (line 2) of the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE has been satisfied.
The two claims and Theorem 2.3 imply that the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE results in a pure Nash equilibrium that is a 2-approximate solution.
Remark 3.3. Notice that by the second claim, the global optimum of the social welfare potential function is also a pure Nash. This means that for any optimum partition S * = (S 
Thus, we have a natural procedure, which is essentially a myopic best-response sequence of the players, that leads to a pure Nash equilibrium. But how long will it take the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE to converge? A nontrivial construction shows that unfortunately, the worst-case running time is exponential in n and m. PROOF. Let m = 2k, and consider k pairs of items with the notation M = {1, 1 , 2, 2 , . . . , k, k }. We call P ⊂ M a proper set if (|P| = k and) P contains exactly one item from each pair (e.g., the set P = {1, 2, . . . , k} is proper). The set of all proper sets is denoted by .
We define fractionally subadditive valuations v 1 and v 2 for the two bidders, so that the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE should proceed as follows. Assume first that it starts from the partition S 1 = {1, 2, 3, . . . , k} and S 2 = {1 , 2 , 3 , . . . , k }. In every two rounds, the bidders exchange a pair of items: after any even round, S 1 and S 2 are complementary proper sets. In the next (odd) round, bidder 2 "robs" an item y ∈ S 1 , by changing to T = S 2 ∪ y. In return, in the coming even round, bidder 1 takes the pair of the robbed item from bidder 2.
Bidder 1 (and also bidder 2) will possess each proper set exactly once. Since | | = 2 k , it takes 2 · 2 k steps for the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE to converge. In order to go over every proper set systematically, the exchange of pairs follows the pattern of the Gray-code. This is a complete sequence of the k-long 0-1 vectors, such that every two consecutive vectors differ in exactly one bid. For example, the Gray-code for k = 3 is (000, 001, 011, 010, 110, 111, 101, 100) .
The jth bid being 0 in the vector means that j ∈ S 1 and j ∈ S 2 ; the jth bid being 1 means the opposite. When the bid in the code is changed, the items j and j should be exchanged in the corresponding two steps of the procedure (observe in the code that item j is exchanged 2 j−1 times). Next, we define fractionally subadditive valuations v 1 and v 2 , for which the aforementioned sequence of exchanges is realized by the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE. The valuation v 1 consists of 2 k additive valuations {a P } P∈ , one for each proper set. The rows in Table I show the additive valuations for k = 3, in the order in which these valuations and the respective proper sets appear as a() and S 1 in even steps of the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE. Whenever an item x is in a proper set P, its value in the additive valuation a P is a P (x) = 1 + s · , where << 2 −k , and the integer s indicates how many times this item was exchanged between the bidders so far.
Similarly, the valuation v 2 is the maximum of 2 k − 1 additive valuations, as shown by 
on the current proper set M\S 1 of bidder 2 and on an additional item y, which is just being "robbed" from bidder 1 in the procedure. Again, the additive value of an item x is 1 + s · , where s shows how often x was exchanged so far. It remains to prove that the procedure selects the given sets in the aforementioned order to be the set T (see the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE). Consider first bidder 2. After an even round, he or she owns some proper set S 2 . His or her payoff on every item of this S 2 is at least 1. On any new item, the additional profit can be at most s · << 1. Therefore, the new set T will contain the current proper set S 2 , and at most one more item, since every additive valuation a() of bidder 2 takes nonzero values on a set of k+ 1 items. The proper set S 2 appears (with all members nonzero) in exactly two consecutive additive valuations, say, in the sets S 2 ∪ {y} and S 2 ∪ {z}. These correspond to the odd steps before (after, respectively) the current even step when bidder 1 took S 1 = M\S 2 . (For example, the set {1, 2, 3} appears in the sets {1, 2, 3, 3 } and {1, 2, 2 , 3} in Table II .) Setting T = S 2 ∪{y} would be a step back, and would mean a negative profit of − , since the previous response of bidder 1 increased r y by (e.g., r 3 = 1 + 3 in our example). On the other hand, setting T = S 2 ∪ {z} means an additional profit of to the value of S 2 , so this is the best response for bidder 2.
The proof that the responses of bidder 1 follow the given order is analogous: at any step responding to bidder 2, bidder 1 has a value of k− 1 from items that currently only he or she bids for; giving up any of these would be a loss of about 1. Furthermore, he or she has the choice to bid for one of the two items in the remaining pair (one of which was just robbed by bidder 2), but he or she can only get the nonrobbed item, because of the increase in the price for the robbed item.
Finally, we show how to modify this instance so that the procedure can start with the empty allocation S 1 = S 2 = ∅. We add two new items to the instance, named 0 and 0 . For player one, item 0 appears with value 1 in the first row of the table, and with value 0 in every other row; item 0 has value 1 + in every row. Similarly, for player two, item 0 has value 1 in the first row, and value 0 in other rows; item 0 adds value 1 + to every row. Now, no matter which player responds first, the procedure follows the same order as shown earlier: bidding the additive valuation of the first row offers a player an additional value of about 1 compared to any other row. In the next step, he or she loses 1 by any response of the other player, and from then on all rows are equivalent concerning the items 0 and 0 . Lehmann et al. [2001] , Dobzinski et al. [2005] , and Dobzinski and Schapira [2006] ). Observe that in our example, the size of these sets |A 1 | and |A 2 | is exponential in n and m.
Submodular Valuation Functions
In this subsection, we focus on submodular valuation functions. We present a polynomial time procedure that we call the MARGINAL-VALUE PROCEDURE, based on the algorithm due to Lehmann et al. [2001] . We show that it results in a pure Nash equilibrium that also satisfies the premises of Theorem 2.3. Therefore, it provides a 2-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
MARGINAL-VALUE PROCEDURE:
(1) Fix an arbitrary order on the items. W.l.o.g. let this order be 1, . . . , m. (2) Initialize S i ← ∅, and r j ← 0, for i = 1, . . . , n, and j = 1, . . . , m.
Observe, that the resulting n-tuple of bid-vectors b * is such that for each item, only one bidder offers a nonzero bid for that item. Also, notice that the MARGINAL-VALUE PROCEDURE only requires m rounds and so ends in polynomial time. 
We fix a subset U. For each item j ∈ U ⊆ S i , we define a( j) to be the marginal value of the item, according to the given ordering, restricted to U (i.e., a( j) depends also on the subset U ). That is, for j ∈ U ,
It is easy to see that j∈U a( j) = v i (U ). We claim that r j ≤ a( j) for all j ∈ U. This will prove j∈U r j ≤ v i (U ). The claim holds by submodularity, as
It follows from the MARGINAL-VALUE PROCEDURE that on the left-hand side, we have r j . The right-hand side is obviously a( j).
CLAIM 4. The output b
* of the POTENTIAL PROCEDURE is a pure Nash equilibrium.
PROOF. For the sake of contradiction, let's assume that b * is not a Nash equilibrium. This means that player i, instead of keeping his or her set S i = X i (b * ), would rather bid for another set T i = X i (b i , b * −i ) that he or she could get if he or she bid b i . Assume that T i is maximal; that is, bidding for any superset of T i would only decrease the utility of i. Player i is improving his or her utility by switching to b i , u i (b i , b * −i ) > u i (b * ). By construction of the MARGINAL-VALUE PROCEDURE, the items of S i are free for player i (since the other players bid 0 for those items), and therefore we obtain
Note that the maximality of T i implies S i ⊆ T i ; otherwise, adding an item of S i \T i to T i would not decrease v i (T i ) and would not increase the price, since the other players bid zero for this item.
As in the proof of Claim 3, we define a( j) on the items of the set T i : if j ∈ T i , then a( j) ). Note that on the left-hand side, we have a( j). Moreover, it follows from the definition of the MARGINAL-VALUE PROCEDURE that for j ∈ S i , the right-hand side equals r j , whereas for j ∈ S i it is at most r j . Finally, The combination of these two claims together with Theorem 2.3 concludes the proof of Theorem 3.5.
APPENDIX
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 2.4, asserting the bound 2 for the Bayesian Price of Anarchy for mixed Nash equilibria. Since p is a Bayes-Nash, the mixed strategy p v i provides better expected utility to player i than the (pure) strategy a i :
